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INTRODUCTION 
Louisiana’s economy has not been the same since September 1901, 
when oil was first discovered near Jennings, Louisiana.1 Since this 
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 1. See Patrick H. Martin, Preface to STATE OF LOUISIANA MINERAL CODE 
AND FORMS, at iii (2009); Patrick S. Ottinger, From the Courts to the Code: The 
Origin and Development of the Law of Louisiana on Mineral Rights, 1 LSU J. 
ENERGY L. & RESOURCES 5, 9 (2012). 




discovery, the oil and gas industry has expanded immensely in the state, 
establishing itself as a vital part of Louisiana’s economy.2 The oil and gas 
industry had a $73.8 billion impact on the Louisiana economy in 2011 and 
provided nearly 287,000 energy-sector jobs throughout the state.3 
Louisiana ranks second in the United States in the production of crude oil, 
second in the production of natural gas, and second in its capacity to refine 
petroleum.4 Given the prevalence of mineral leases in the state, the 
interests of Louisiana mineral lessors and lessees contribute significantly 
to the sizeable economic impact of the oil and gas industry.5 
Because mineral leases can typically be very valuable, it is 
unsurprising that lease disputes often result in litigation between mineral 
lessors and lessees.6 Several different articles in the Louisiana Mineral 
Code provide remedies for one of these types of disputes—a mineral 
lessee’s failure to pay royalties.7 These articles provide that “[t]he court 
may award as damages double the amount of royalties due, interest on that 
sum from the date due, and a reasonable attorney’s fee.”8 Over the years, 
Louisiana courts and scholars alike have interpreted this code provision 
differently, and the Louisiana Supreme Court has yet to provide any 
guidance on the interpretation.9  
                                                                                                             
 2. See generally LOREN C. SCOTT, THE ENERGY SECTOR: STILL A GIANT 
ECONOMIC ENGINE FOR THE LOUISIANA ECONOMY (2014) (an economic impact 
study of the oil and gas industry commissioned by Mid-Continent Oil and Gas 
Association in partnership with Grow Louisiana Coalition).  
 3. Id. at iii. 
 4. Id. 
 5. See Louisiana State Mineral Royalty Revenue, LA. DEP’T NAT. RESOURCES, 
http://dnr.louisiana.gov/assets/TAD/data/facts_and_figures/table28.htm [perma.cc/7 
G9D-MYLB] (last updated May 27, 2015) (showing that the state of Louisiana had a 
revenue of $568.42 million from mineral leases in 2013). 
 6. Id. 
 7. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 31:139, :140, :212.23(C) (2000). Title 31 of 
the Louisiana Revised Statutes is typically referred to as the “Louisiana Mineral 
Code,” and the sections of the Title 31 are typically referred to as “articles.” Id. § 
31:1. Accordingly, this Comment will refer to all sections of Title 31 as articles 
of the Louisiana Mineral Code. 
 8. Id. § 31:139; accord id. § 31:140; see also id. § 31:212.23(C) (“[T]he 
court may award as damages double the amount due, legal interest on that sum 
from the date due, and a reasonable attorney’s fee . . . .”). Louisiana Mineral Code 
article 31:138.1(D) uses the same language, except the award is mandatory rather 
than discretionary. Id. § 31:138.1(D). 
 9. Compare Cimarex Energy Co. v. Mauboules, 40 So. 3d 931, 952 (La. 
2010) (Knoll, J., dissenting) (stating that the natural reading of Mineral Code 
article 212.21 calls for double, rather than treble the amount of royalties due as 
damages), with Cimarex Energy Co. v. Mauboules, 6 So. 3d 399, 407 (La. Ct. 
App. 3d 2009) (holding that Mineral Code article 212.23(C) provides for treble 
damages), and Wegman v. Cent. Transmission, Inc., 499 So. 2d 436, 451–52 (La. 
Ct. App. 2d 1986) (affirming the trial court’s JNOV award of triple the amount of 




One side of this debate believes that the statute clearly provides for 
damages worth twice the amount of royalties due. The other side asserts 
that the damages clause is separate and that the court must add the double 
royalties penalty to the original unpaid royalty, essentially resulting in 
treble damages.10 This interpretive discrepancy has the potential to create 
a multi-million dollar difference in the amount of damages awarded.11  
Louisiana courts should recognize that Mineral Code articles 138.1, 
139, 140, and 212.23 do not provide for treble damages. In an effort to 
increase the clarity of the law, the legislature should revise the wording of 
these Mineral Code articles to expressly state that courts may grant a total 
award in an amount less than twice the value of royalties due. At a 
minimum, the legislature should add a comment to the applicable articles 
and explain that the articles allow for double rather than treble damages. 
This Comment seeks to end the debate over the interpretation of 
Mineral Code articles 138.1, 139, 140, and 212.23 by showing that treble 
damages are not appropriate for a lessee’s failure to pay royalties. Part I 
gives a brief overview of the applicable laws regulating the oil and gas 
industry, including a short history of how the Louisiana Supreme Court 
molded the body of mineral law through its decisions, which were later 
codified in the Louisiana Mineral Code. Part II uses civilian interpretive 
methods to illustrate the two conflicting interpretations of the Mineral 
Code articles. Part III concludes that the Mineral Code provides for double 
damages and proposes two possible legislative actions to make this 
abundantly clear. 
I. THE LAW OF THE LAND: THE LOUISIANA MINERAL CODE 
Louisiana courts and scholars have disagreed on the interpretation of 
several Mineral Code articles.12 The language from Mineral Code articles 
139, 140, and 212.23 states that “the court may award as damages double 
the amount of royalties due.”13 An exploration of the development of 
                                                                                                             
royalties due pursuant to Mineral Code article 140 after the jury awarded double 
damages). 
 10. See supra note 9. Treble damages refer to penalty damages amounting to 
three times the value of actual damages. For example: John (lessee) was supposed 
to pay $1,000 in royalties to Steve (lessor) and did not. Under these articles, a 
court could award Steve a total of $3,000 if it interprets the articles to allow for 
“treble damages.” 
 11. See Cimarex, 6 So. 3d at 407 (deciding whether the total award for unpaid 
royalties worth $3.2 million should amount to $6.4 million (double the unpaid 
royalties) or $9.6 million (treble the unpaid royalties)). 
 12. See supra note 9. 
 13. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 31:139, :140, :212.23. 




Louisiana law, stemming from the Civil Code and the Mineral Code, helps 
to interpret these articles. 
A. The Development of Mineral Law in Louisiana 
After the discovery of oil and gas in Louisiana, the courts had 
significant difficulties with issues related to oil and gas because the Civil 
Code did not provide specifically for mineral interests.14 In fact, the 
legislature did not add the term “mineral interest” to the Civil Code until 
1940.15 This presented a unique problem in Louisiana—unlike the 49 
common law states, legislation and custom are Louisiana’s only 
recognized sources of law.16 The restriction to rendering decisions based 
on legislation or custom proved to be difficult for courts once oil and gas 
issues arose.17 The Louisiana Supreme Court recognized the potential 
value of the oil and gas industry and attempted to lay the ground rules of 
the industry on a case-by-case basis.18 The Court began developing a body 
of law through its decisions by analogizing new mineral law issues to 
existing Civil Code articles, attempting to remain true to the principles of 
the Civil Code.19  
The Louisiana Supreme Court case of Frost-Johnson Lumber Co. v. 
Salling’s Heirs illustrates this inductive process.20 In Frost-Johnson, the 
Court decided the nature of a grant or reservation of minerals under 
Louisiana law.21 The Court needed to determine whether the right to 
                                                                                                             
 14. See Natalie Oil Co. v. La. Ry. & Navigation Co., 69 So. 146, 147 (La. 
1915) (“The difficulty with the articles of the Code of Practice is that they were 
framed at a time when the nature and existence of oil under the soil of this state 
was not supposed or known, and the laws were not therefore framed to meet such 
things and the conditions surrounding them.”). 
 15. Ottinger, supra note 1, at 11 (“The words ‘mineral interest’ were first 
introduced into the Civil Code by amendments to Article 741 . . . by Act No. 336 
of 1940 . . . .”). 
 16. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1 (2015) (“The sources of law are legislation and 
custom.”).  
 17. Ottinger, supra note 1, at 11; see also Albert Tate, Jr., Techniques of 
Judicial Interpretation in Louisiana, 22 LA. L. REV. 727, 728 (1962). The main 
source of civil legislation in Louisiana can be found in the Louisiana Civil Code, 
which is a “comprehensive, systematic, and coherent enactment regulating most 
of the area of private law.” Id. 
 18. Ottinger, supra note 1, at 11. 
 19. James L. Dennis, Interpretation and Application of the Civil Code and 
the Evaluation of Judicial Precedent, 54 LA. L. REV. 1, 8 (1993). 
 20. See Frost-Johnson Lumber Co. v. Salling’s Heirs, 91 So. 207, 215 (La. 
1922) (analogizing articles in the Civil Code to a mineral law issue to find that oil 
and gas beneath the surface of a property owner’s land is not owned until extracted 
and possessed). 
 21. Id. at 213–16. 




extract oil and gas from the land owned by another is a servitude, which 
expires after ten years of nonuse, or some other type of property interest.22 
In this seminal case, the Court implemented a classic example of civilian 
analysis by analogizing the facts to several articles in the Civil Code, while 
also disregarding other applications of articles that were contrary to public 
policy or incompatible with Louisiana’s civil law.23 The Court found 
support in Civil Code article 505 for the notion that minerals are 
susceptible of ownership in place—that is, still in the ground.24 The article 
provided then, as it does now, that the “ownership of the soil carries with 
it the ownership of all that is directly above and under it.”25 This view 
seemingly lent support to the existence of a “mineral estate,” which allows 
a surface owner to sell the rights to the minerals below his property, and 
those rights are never required to revert back to the land.26 The Court found 
additional support for this argument in the actual language of the disputed 
contract, which was more indicative of a sale in place or a mineral estate, 
especially as to the solid minerals.27  
In contrast, a concurring opinion found a codal foundation for the 
proposition that oil and gas beneath one’s land must belong to the 
landowner in Civil Code article 519.28 This article provided, “[p]igeons, 
bees or fish, which go from one pigeon-house, hive or fish pond, into 
another pigeon-house, hive or fish pond, belong to the owner of those 
things; provided, such pigeons, bees or fish have not been attracted thither 
by fraud or artifice.”29 One justice analogized these animals to oil because 
both are migratory in the sense that they are capable of moving back and 
forth between properties.30 This view would allow the mineral rights to 
revert back to the land after a certain amount of time.31 
                                                                                                             
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. at 221 (“Contracts excepting ores and minerals from grants of land, 
with a reservation of the right to enter upon the portion thereof granted, are in 
accordance with long established usage and have been invariably held by the 
courts to be valid; hence they are not contrary to public policy.” (quoting 18 
RULING CASE LAW § 84 (William M. McKinney & Burdett A. Rich eds., 1917) 
(internal quotations marks omitted)). 
 24. Id. at 215. 
 25. LA. CIV. CODE art. 505 (1870); see also LA. CIV. CODE art. 490 cmt. a 
(2015) (“This provision reproduces the substance of Article 505 of the Louisiana 
Civil Code of 1870.”). 
 26. See Frost-Johnson, 91 So. at 223 (Provosty, J., concurring). 
 27. Id. at 209 (majority opinion); see also Ottinger, supra note 1, at 23. 
 28. Frost-Johnson, 91 So. at 224 (Provosty, J., concurring); LA. CIV. CODE 
art. 519 (1870); see also LA. CIV. CODE art. 3415 cmt. (2015) (“This provision is 
based on Article 519 of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870 . . . .”). 
 29. LA. CIV. CODE art. 519 (1870); see also Ottinger, supra note 1, at 23. 
 30. Frost-Johnson, 91 So. at 224 (Provosty, J., concurring). 
 31. See id. 




The Court weighed the different interpretations by considering various 
policy concerns associated with each approach32 and it eventually decided 
that mineral rights are analogous to servitudes, rejecting the idea of 
“mineral estates” in Louisiana.33 Overall, Frost-Johnson created a strong 
template for courts to handle future cases involving mineral law disputes, 
which the redactors of the Civil Code did not foresee.  
The Louisiana Supreme Court continued to develop this body of law 
by analogizing mineral issues to provisions in the Civil Code relating to 
servitudes and the general rules of conventional obligations and leases. 
The Court initially struggled, however, given the lack of specific 
legislative guidance.34 Although forming the body of mineral law, justices 
of the Louisiana Supreme Court often expressed their frustrations with 
bending and warping articles of the Civil Code to fit the peculiarities of 
mineral law without receiving any direct legislative guidance.35 As a 
result, a Mineral Code was proposed as early as 1938.36 It was not until 
1974, however, that the Louisiana Legislature finally enacted the Mineral 
Code, which codified preexisting jurisprudence in this area of law.37 The 
Mineral Code contains 13 chapters and is divided by subject matter, 
similar to the Civil Code.38 Because the Mineral Code is a specialized 
extension of the Civil Code, provisions of the Civil Code and other 
legislation are applicable when the Mineral Code does not expressly or 
impliedly provide for a given situation.39  
The committee responsible for drafting the Mineral Code submitted 
recommendations for the creation of a mineral code to the Council of the 
                                                                                                             
 32. Ottinger, supra note 1, at 23–26. 
 33. Frost-Johnson, 91 So. at 230–31 (Provosty, J., concurring); see also 
Wemple v. Nabors Oil & Gas Co., 97 So. 666, 668–69 (La. 1923) (“And we 
therefore conclude that there is in this state no such estate in lands as a corporeal 
‘mineral estate,’ distinct from and independent of the surface estate; that the so-
called ‘mineral estate’ by whatever term described, or however acquired or 
reserved, is a mere servitude upon the land in which the minerals lie, giving only 
the right to extract such minerals and appropriate them.”).  
 34. Martin, supra note 1, at vii. 
 35. See, e.g., St. Martin Land Co. v. Pinckney, 33 So. 2d 169, 172 (La. 1947) 
(noting that the Court was “compelled to apply the articles of the Civil Code that 
were most applicable to the nature of the rights asserted” because the Legislature 
refused to adopt statutes to guide the court); Natalie Oil Co. v. La. Ry. & 
Navigation Co., 69 So. 146, 147 (La. 1915) (noting the difficulty in applying 
articles from the code because they were framed before the nature and existence 
of oil and gas was known in this state). 
 36. Ottinger, supra note 1, at 33. 
 37. Martin, supra note 1, at iv–v. 
 38. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:3 cmt. (2000). 
 39. Id. § 31:2; LA. CIV. CODE art. 561 cmt. a (2015). 




Louisiana State Law Institute in 1971.40 In this document, the committee 
noted that dissolution of mineral leases for nonpayment of royalties “is 
one of the most, if not the most, confused and unsatisfactory areas of 
Louisiana mineral law.”41 The committee thought that the biggest problem 
with the jurisprudence in this area of the law was that mineral lessors were 
only entitled to mere interest upon unpaid royalties when a lessee failed to 
pay royalties due.42 But the committee disfavored the harsh remedy of 
lease dissolution because a lease might involve the investment of millions 
of dollars.43 Thus, the drafters of the Mineral Code took these 
recommendations and created Mineral Code articles 137 through 141, 
hoping to deal with the longstanding issue.44 
B. Mineral Leases and Remedies for Nonpayment of Royalties 
The term “royalty” is used throughout the Mineral Code in different 
contexts, but this Comment focuses on how the term is used in connection 
with mineral leases. The Code defines “royalty,” in the context of mineral 
leases, as: 
[A]ny interest in production, or its value, from or attributable to 
land subject to a mineral lease, that is deliverable or payable to the 
lessor or others entitled to share therein. Such interests in 
production or its value are “royalty,” whether created by the lease 
or by separate instrument, if they comprise a part of the negotiated 
agreement resulting in execution of the lease. “Royalty” also 
                                                                                                             
 40. LA. STATE LAW INST., SUGGESTED PRINCIPLES OF LOUISIANA MINERAL 
LAW—A BASIS FOR REFORM (George W. Hardy, III rep., 1971) [hereinafter LA. 
LAW INST., SUGGESTED PRINCIPLES]. The recommendations were in the form of an 
Exposé Des Motifs, which translated into English means “Explanatory 
Memorandum.” 
 41. Id. at 186. The drafters of the Mineral Code implemented this section into 
the comment to article 137. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:137 cmt.  
 42. Id.  
 43. Id.  
 44. See LA. LAW INST., SUGGESTED PRINCIPLES, supra note 40, at 188 (“[T]he 
intent of paragraph (c) of this recommendation to provide lessors with a 
meaningful remedy while simultaneously giving operators who have made 
substantial investments in producing properties the security of title which the 
nature and size of their investment deserve.”); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:137 cmt. 
(noting that the intent of articles 137 to 141 is verbatim to the one expressed in 
the Exposé Des Motifs). 




includes sums payable to the lessor that are classified by the lease 
as constructive production.45 
If a mineral lessor wants to recover damages for a lessee’s failure to 
make timely or proper payment, the lessor is required to give the lessee 
written notice of the failure to pay before the lessor makes a judicial 
demand for damages or dissolution of the lease.46 Several articles in the 
Louisiana Mineral Code allow for damages to a mineral lessor when a 
mineral lessee fails to pay royalties due.47 These articles state in part that 
“[t]he court may award as damages double the amount of royalties due, 
interest on that sum from the date due and a reasonable attorney’s fee.”48 
The purpose of these articles is to provide a mineral lessor with something 
more meaningful than just the amount of unpaid royalties plus interest, 
while still protecting the lessee against the harsh penalty of lease 
dissolution.49 
Article 138.1 provides that the court shall award as damages double 
the amount of royalties due to a mineral lessor when a lessee fails to pay 
royalties solely because the lessor has not executed a division order.50 This 
treatment is consistent with the intent of the revision of the law governing 
nonpayment of royalties to protect the lessors by providing an adequate 
remedy if royalties are not paid, while still avoiding the harsh penalty that 
dissolution of the lease would impose upon the lessee.51 Although other 
articles contain this damages provision, only article 138.1 imposes a 
mandatory award.52 
Article 139 allows the court to impose damages double the amount of 
royalties due if the lessee’s failure to pay is either fraudulent or willful and 
                                                                                                             
 45. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:213(5). This Comment focuses on royalties in 
connection with mineral leases and not as mineral royalties are defined in other 
articles of the Mineral Code. 
 46. Id. § 31:137. 
 47. Id. §§ 31:139, :140, :212.23(C); see also id. § 31:138.1(D). 
 48. Id. § 31:139; accord id. § 31:140; see also id. §§ 31:212.23(C), :138.1(D). 
 49. Id. § 31:137 cmt. 
 50. Id. § 31:138.1(D) (“If the lessee fails to pay royalties solely because his 
lessor has not executed a division order as defined in this Article, the court shall 
award as damages double the amount of royalties due, legal interest on that sum 
from the date due, and reasonable attorney’s fees.”). A division order is defined 
as “an instrument setting forth the proportional ownership in oil or gas, or the 
value thereof, which division order is prepared after examination of title and 
which is executed by the owners of the production or other persons having 
authority to act on behalf of the owners thereof.” Id. § 31:138.1(A). 
 51. Thomas H. Kiggans, Article 138 of the Mineral Code: A Reasonable 
Cause for Nonpayment of Royalties, 43 LA. L. REV. 1271, 1278–79 (1983). 
 52. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 31:138.1(D), :139, :140, :212.23(C). 




without reasonable grounds.53 The jurisprudence has been unclear on what 
exactly amounts to “reasonable grounds,” except for two scenarios.54 First, 
courts have held that an administrative or clerical error that leads to 
nonpayment constitutes reasonable grounds.55 Second, the courts have held 
that failure to pay is reasonable when payments were not due in light of the 
custom of the industry.56  
The Code also provides this discretionary award in other 
circumstances.57 One such example is article 140, which instructs that the 
court may award double the amount of royalties due as damages if the lessee 
fails to pay the royalties due or fails to inform the lessor of a reasonable 
cause for failure to pay after the lessor gives the lessee notice as required by 
article 137.58 For example, if a mineral lessee fails to pay $1,000 in royalties 
owed to the lessor and also fails to inform the lessor of a reasonable cause 
for the failure to pay, the court has the option of awarding the lessor damages 
up to $2,000.59 Under the current ambiguity in the law, however, courts may 
award a total of $2,000 or $3,000.  
The Mineral Code also provides this remedy in article 212.23 for when 
production and royalty payments are owed to someone other than a mineral 
                                                                                                             
 53. Id. § 31:139 (“If the lessee pays the royalties due in response to the 
required notice, the remedy of dissolution shall be unavailable unless it be found 
that the original failure to pay was fraudulent. The court may award as damages 
double the amount of royalties due, interest on that sum from the date due, and a 
reasonable attorney’s fee, provided the original failure to pay royalties was either 
fraudulent or willful and without reasonable grounds. In all other cases, such as 
mere oversight or neglect, damages shall be limited to interest on the royalties 
computed from the date due, and a reasonable attorney’s fee if such interest is not 
paid within thirty days of written demand therefor.”). 
 54. Kiggans, supra note 51, at 1275. 
 55. See Hebert v. Sun Oil Co., 223 So. 2d 897, 899 (La. Ct. App. 1969) 
(holding that a clerical error that resulted in overpayment to the lessor of $13.61 
was reasonable and did not constitute a serious basis for dissolving the lease). 
 56. See Canik v. Tex. Int’l Petroleum Corp., 308 So. 2d 453, 457 (La. Ct. 
App. 1975) (holding that the lessees withholding of royalty payments so that all 
royalty owners could be paid at one time was in good faith and constituted a 
reasonable cause for nonpayment). 
 57. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 31:140, :212.23(C). 
 58. Id. § 31:140 (“If the lessee fails to pay royalties due or fails to inform the 
lessor of a reasonable cause for failure to pay in response to the required notice, 
the court may award as damages double the amount of royalties due, interest on 
that sum from the date due, and a reasonable attorney’s fee regardless of the cause 
for the original failure to pay royalties. The court may also dissolve the lease in 
its discretion.”); id. § 31:137. 
 59. See id. § 31:140. Whether this means that the $2,000 is the total award or 
is an additional award on top of the original royalties due, resulting in a $3,000 
total award, is the subject of this Comment and will be addressed in detail. 




lessor.60 This situation can occur when royalty payments are owed to the 
owner of a mineral royalty under Mineral Code article 80.61 In this situation, 
the mineral royalty owner is not a mineral lessor and merely has the passive 
right to collect mineral royalty payments.62 The issue then arises as to which 
interpretation of these articles is preferable—double or treble damages. 
II. CIVILIAN INTERPRETATION OF THE MINERAL CODE ARTICLES 
Proper use of civilian interpretative methods reveals that Mineral 
Code articles 138.1, 139, 140, and 212.23 provide for a total award worth 
double, rather than treble, the amount of unpaid royalties. Civilian 
interpretative theorists typically differ in their favored methods, but most 
experts agree that a sound interpretation of the law requires the use of 
multiple methods.63 Many scholars and judges utilize at least one of two 
popular methods of civilian interpretation: exegetical and teleological.64 
The exegetical method looks to three different features of a given text—
grammatical, logical, and historical—to ascertain the legislative intent 
                                                                                                             
 60. Id. § 31:212.23(C) (“If the obligor fails to pay and fails to state a 
reasonable cause for failure to pay in response to the notice, the court may award 
as damages double the amount due, legal interest on that sum from the date due, 
and a reasonable attorney’s fee regardless of the cause for the original failure to 
pay.”). 
 61. See id. § 31:80 (“A mineral royalty is the right to participate in production 
of minerals from land owned by another or land subject to a mineral servitude 
owned by another. Unless expressly qualified by the parties, a royalty is a right to 
share in gross production free of mining or drilling and production costs.”). 
 62. Id. 
 63. FRANÇOIS GÉNY, METHODE D’INTERPRÉTATION ET SOURCES EN DROIT 
PRIVÉ POSITIF no. 223, at 565 (La. State Law Inst. trans., 2d ed. 1954); see also 
JULIO C. CUETO-RUA, JUDICIAL METHODS OF INTERPRETATION OF THE LAW 274–
75 (1981); JEAN-LOUIS BERGEL, MÉTHODOLOGIE JURIDIQUE 261–63 (2001); 
Katie Drell Grissel, Comment, The Legal Fiction of “Clear Text” in Willis-
Knighton v. Caddo-Shreveport Sales and Use Tax Commission, 67 LA. L. REV. 
523, 529 (2007); see generally Albert Tate, Jr., Civilian Methodology in 
Louisiana, 44 TUL. L. REV. 673 (1970) (quoting Clarence Morrow, Louisiana 
Blueprint: Civilian Codification and Legal Method for State and Nation, 17 TUL. 
L. REV. 351, 537 (1943) (referencing the use of several methods of interpretation 
to ascertain the meaning of legislation, including elements from both the 
exegetical and teleological methods); Tate, supra note 17, at 727 (discussing 
“some of the techniques available to a Louisiana judge to ‘find the law’ by which 
to decide the case, once the facts are established”)). 
 64. See CUETO-RUA, supra note 63, at 274, 275 (“In beginning the dialectical 
process, the judge attempts to discover the meaning of the rules of law subject to 
his consideration by simultaneously using two or more judicial methods. He 
begins with a grammatical and logical approach, but if this procedure does not 
yield a meaning consistent with the meaning that the judge is discovering in the 
facts of the case, he will switch to another judicial method of interpretation.”); 
EVA STEINER, FRENCH LAW: A COMPARATIVE APPROACH 69–70 (2010). 




behind ambiguous texts.65 The teleological method, on the other hand, 
directs courts “to identify the social purpose or objective of the legislation 
under consideration with a view to applying it in a way which does not 
conflict with this purpose.”66 Louisiana courts have not fully utilized these 
methods of interpretation to ascertain the meaning of the Mineral Code 
articles at issue. By looking at all of these methods together along with the 
applicable jurisprudence and doctrine, however, the true meaning of the 
Mineral Code articles becomes clearer. 
A. Exegetical Method: Using Logical and Historical Interpretations to 
Show that the Mineral Code Does Not Provide for Treble Damages 
The exegetical method of interpretation looks to the intent of the 
legislative drafters to clarify ambiguous text in the law.67 This method 
attempts to discover the purpose of the statute by utilizing grammatical, 
logical, and historical interpretation.68 The exegetical method assumes that 
the statute is an act of legislative will and the most rational method for 
interpreting this will is to investigate the legislature’s intent at the time the 
statute was written.69 Thus, the interpreter must start by looking to the 
actual language of the statute in dispute. This method follows the 
presumption that there is logical coherence and consistency within the 
system of law, of which the text in question is just one small piece.70 This 
method is different from the literal method of interpretation, which only 
looks to the actual text and grammar of the statute in question to determine 
the legislative intent without considering sources outside the text of the 
law.71 The exegetical method encourages the interpreter to look beyond 
the text of the statute to ascertain the legislative intent.72 
                                                                                                             
 65. STEINER, supra note 64, at 63–84; see also BERGEL, supra note 63, at 
236. 
 66. Grissel, supra note 63, at 537 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also 
BERGEL, supra note 63, at 241.  
 67. STEINER, supra note 64, at 69. 
 68. Id. The grammatical method of interpretation is not instructive for the 
issue of this Comment. 
 69. Id.; BERGEL, supra note 63, at 240–41; cf. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2 (2015) 
(“Legislation is a solemn expression of legislative will.”). 
 70. GÉNY, supra note 63, no. 14, at 21; see also BERGEL, supra note 63, at 
254. 
 71. BERGEL, supra note 63, at 237–38. 
 72. Id. at 240–41; STEINER, supra note 64, at 69–70. 




1. Logical Interpretation 
The basis of logical interpretation is that each piece of law is a product 
of a rational and logical legislature, and each statute forms a piece that 
contributes to the meaning of the entire system, while the whole also gives 
meaning to the individual parts.73 Portalis’s Discours Préliminaire, which 
the drafters of the French Civil Code used, serves as a useful summary of 
the logical method: 
(a) Quand la loi est claire, il faut la suivre. Where the meaning of 
a statute is clear, it must be followed. 
(b) Quand elle est obscure, il faut en approfondir les dispositions 
pour en pénétrer l’esprit. Where the language of a statute is 
obscure or ambiguous, one should construe it in accordance with 
its spirit rather than its letter in order to determine its legal 
meaning. 
(c) Si l’on manque de loi, il faut consulter l’usage ou l’equité. 
Where there is a gap in the law, judges must resort to customary 
laws and equity when deciding a case.74 
The first maxim found its place in Louisiana Civil Code article 975 and 
is often referred to in its Latin iteration, interpretatio cessat in claris.76 In 
Louisiana, the principle that “‘[t]he starting point for the interpretation of 
                                                                                                             
 73. PIERRE-ANDRÉ CÔTÉ, THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGISLATION IN CANADA 
308 (Douglas J. Simsovic trans., 3d ed. 2000). 
 74. STEINER, supra note 64, at 66 (translating JEAN-ÉTIENNE-MARIE 
PORTALIS, DISCOURS PRÉLIMINAIRE DU PREMIER PROJET DE CODE CIVIL 22 
(1801)). The third maxim does not apply in this instance, because there is not a 
“gap” in the law. 
 75. LA. CIV. CODE art. 9 (2015) (“When a law is clear and unambiguous and 
its application does not lead to absurd consequences, the law shall be applied as 
written and no further interpretation may be made in search of the intent of the 
legislature.”). 
 76. STEINER, supra note 64, at 66; see also BERGEL, supra note 63, at 233. 
The purpose of this method of interpretation is to keep from extending or 
restricting the scope of a statute when the text is clear and unambiguous and to 
accept the intention of the legislature over the plain meaning of the text when the 
two conflict. STEINER, supra note 64, at 66–67; BERGEL, supra note 63, at 233. 
Louisiana Civil Code article 9 has been called the “plain meaning” rule in 
Louisiana. Louisiana Municipal Ass’n v. State, 773 So. 2d 663, 669 (La. 2000) 
(“[W]hen the intention of the legislature is so apparent from the face of the statute 
that there can be no question as to its meaning, there is no room for construction.” 
(quoting NORMAN J. SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 
46.01, at 118–120 (6th ed. 2000)) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 




any statute is the language of the statute itself’” is firmly established.77 
Reviewing legislative history to unmask legislative intent is inappropriate 
until after a principled examination of the text of the disputed legislation 
has occurred.78 The Civil Code instructs that when a law is clear and 
unambiguous and its application would not lead to an absurd result, the 
courts should apply the law as written.79 The text in question provides that 
“[t]he court may award as damages double the amount of royalties due.”80 
Judges, scholars, and experts in the field of mineral law have interpreted 
the articles’ language differently.81 One argument is that the plain reading 
of this language means that the unpaid amount of royalties are owed to the 
lessor in any event, and the double royalties award must be added to the 
original amount of royalties owed, essentially creating a treble award.82 
The alternative interpretation posits that the most natural reading of the 
articles is to permit the court to allow a total award equaling double the 
amount of the unpaid royalties.83 The fact that there are two competing 
interpretations of the Mineral Code articles supports that the text is 
ambiguous as written. 
A version of the second French maxim is found in article 10 of the 
Louisiana Civil Code.84 This maxim and article 10 both provide that one 
                                                                                                             
 77. Foti v. Holliday, 27 So. 3d 813, 817 (La. 2009) (quoting Dejoie v. 
Medley, 9 So. 3d 826, 829 (La. 2009)). 
 78. Exxon Pipeline Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 728 So. 2d 855, 860 (La. 
1999). The Louisiana Supreme Court emphasized that “[w]hat ‘a legislature says 
in the text of a statute is considered the best evidence of the legislative intent or 
will.’” State v. Sidney Williams, 800 So. 2d 790, 800 (La. 2001) (quoting SINGER, 
supra note 76, § 46.03, at 135). 
 79. LA. CIV. CODE art. 9 (2015). 
 80. See supra note 8. 
 81. Compare Cimarex Energy Co. v. Mauboules, 6 So. 3d 399 (La. Ct. App. 
3d 2009) (finding that Mineral Code article 212.23 allows for an award worth 
treble the value of unpaid royalties), with Cimarex Energy Co. v. Mauboules, 40 
So. 3d 931, 952 (La. 2010) (Knoll, J., dissenting) (concluding that Mineral Code 
article 212.23 only allows for a maximum award of double the value of unpaid 
royalties); compare also Patrick H. Martin, Mineral Rights, 48 LA. L. REV. 387, 
409 (1987) [hereinafter Martin, Mineral Rights] (believing that the Mineral Code 
allows for an award worth treble the amount of unpaid royalties), with Jonathan 
A. Hunter, Louisiana Royalty Disputes, 12 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 61, 63 
(1997), and Sarah Y. Dicharry, Comment, Cimarex v. Mauboules: The Concursus 
Crisis, 57 LOY. L. REV. 407, 431 (2011) (arguing that the Mineral Code does not 
allow for damages worth treble the value of unpaid royalties). 
 82. Cimarex, 6 So. 3d at 407; see also infra Part II.C.1–2 (discussing the 
competing jurisprudence and doctrine). 
 83. Cimarex, 40 So. 3d at 952 (Knoll, J., dissenting); see infra Part II.C.1–2 
(discussing the competing jurisprudence and doctrine). 
 84. LA. CIV. CODE art. 10 (2015) (“When the language of the law is 
susceptible of different meanings, it must be interpreted as having the meaning 
that best conforms to the purpose of the law.”).  




should interpret and search for legislative intent if the text is ambiguous 
and susceptible of different meanings.85 In a situation where the language of 
the law is susceptible to multiple interpretations, the courts must interpret 
the law as having the meaning that best conforms to its purpose.86 A 
comment to Mineral Code article 137 shows that the intent of articles 137 
to 141 was to provide lessors with a meaningful remedy while also giving 
operators security of title by protecting the lessee from dissolution.87 
Additionally, the comment states that the total effect of these articles is “to 
provide a spur to timely payment of royalties due while giving lessees a 
reasonable way in which to avoid the harsh remedy of cancellation.”88 
Because the purpose of the provision is to incentivize lessees to pay on time 
without dissolving their leases, any multiple damages, whether double or 
treble, seems to fall in line with the broad intentions of the Mineral Code 
articles.89 Still, because the goal of the articles is to diminish lease 
dissolution while also adding teeth to the remedy, some may view as more 
logical for a larger potential damages award to apply to give lessees greater 
incentive to make royalty payments, thus supporting the treble damages 
theory. 
As one of the areas of the Code that the Louisiana Supreme Court used 
to form the initial body of mineral law, the general contract provisions lend 
insight into the intent inquiry.90 Analogizing the Mineral Code provisions to 
principles of general contract law is useful to ascertain the meaning of these 
articles by considering the basic civilian proposition that the formal system 
of law is intertwined as a homogeneous unit.91 Under this reasoning, the 
obligation to pay lease royalties is a contractual obligation, and failure to 
pay—or the underpayment of royalties—constitutes a breach of that 
contract. Therefore, an action for unpaid or underpaid royalties is an action 
in contract. According to the Civil Code, “[d]amages are measured by the 
                                                                                                             
 85. Id.; STEINER, supra note 64, at 69; see BERGEL, supra note 63, at 233 
(noting and criticizing the idea of the “clear text”). 
 86. LA. CIV. CODE art. 10. 
 87. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:137 cmt. (2000). The operators want security 
of title or the assurance that the lease will not be dissolved. 
 88. Id. 
 89. See id. 
 90. See GÉNY, supra note 63, no. 165, at 381 (“[T]he procedure of extension 
by analogy, resting on the solid basis of written law (exceptionally even 
customary law) offer[s] interpretation a first-class help . . . .”); Martin, supra note 
1, at vii; see also LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:2 cmt. (“The Mineral Code is a 
specialized extension of the Civil Code, and in instances where the Mineral Code 
does not make express or implied provision for a particular situation, it is intended 
that the principles of the Civil Code will continue to be applicable, either directly 
or by appropriate analogy.”). 
 91. GÉNY, supra note 63, no. 14, at 21 (discussing Savigny and his 
successor’s ideas on analogy). 




loss sustained by the obligee and the profit of which he has been deprived.”92 
Thus, in a situation where a lessee fails to pay some or all of the royalties 
owed, the unpaid royalties clearly constitute “damages” because those 
royalties are what the lessor was deprived by the nonpayment.93 This theory 
suggests that, despite arguments to the contrary, the “unpaid royalties” and 
“damages” are not two separate things.94 In fact, the unpaid royalties are the 
damages that the lessor suffered from the underpayment or nonpayment, and 
the Mineral Code allows for the court, in its discretion, to double that 
amount as the total award—not treble it. Using this interpretation, the 
language from the Mineral Code articles clearly and unambiguously 
supports double damages. 
Further, at least 12 other Louisiana statutes explicitly use terms such as 
“triple” or “treble” damages when the legislature has intended for treble 
damages to apply.95 For example, the Louisiana Legislature enacted 
Louisiana Revised Statutes section 3:4278.1, which made the destruction of 
any trees growing on the land of another unlawful and created a statutory 
penalty of treble the fair market value of the destroyed trees.96 In this statute, 
the legislature explicitly provided “for civil damages in the amount of 
                                                                                                             
 92. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1995 (2015). 
 93. See id. 
 94. See id. 
 95. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 3:4278.1(B) (Supp. 2015) (The unlawful 
cutting of timber results in damages “three times the fair market value of the trees 
cut.”); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22:1023(F) (Supp. 2015) (allowing for “treble 
damages” in cases of unlawful disclosure of private genetic information); LA. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:2027 (2000) (allowing an employee to receive “triple 
damages” in cases of retaliatory termination for environmental whistle blowing); 
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 39:2163 (2015) (an employee can recover “treble 
damages” for retaliatory termination for disclosing employers’ fraud in hurricane 
relief claims); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51.444 (Supp. 2015) (sales representatives 
may recover “treble damages” for nonpayment of owed commissions); id. § 
51:1409 (allowing for the recovery of “three times the actual damages sustained” 
in claims for unfair trade practices); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 3:3671 (Supp. 2010) 
(making anyone that knowingly receives a “delivery of agricultural products in 
containers . . . loaned by another to a grower or producer . . . liable in damages in 
a sum three times the value of the containers received”); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
3:4116(B) (Supp. 2010) (providing for damages equal to “three times the actual 
damages sustained as a result of [the] violation” under Louisiana Dairy 
Stabilization Law); Id. § 3:4690(F) (providing that “the court may award three 
times the amount of actual damages to the prevailing retailer or petroleum 
jobber”); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:3552 (Supp. 2015) (allowing a consumer “the 
right to recover three times the amount” of a charge if the court finds the extender 
of credit intentionally violated Louisiana Consumer Credit Law); LA. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 45:1166.1(B)(1) (Supp. 2010) (stating that “[c]omplainants whose long 
distance telephone services have been illegally transferred may file a petition for 
damages equal to three times the amount of damages incurred”). 
 96. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 3:4278.1(B) (Supp. 2015). 




three times the fair market value of the trees cut, felled, destroyed, 
removed, or diverted.”97 The Louisiana Supreme Court found that 
violators of this statute are not required to pay both the value of the trees 
and an additional amount of triple the value of the trees, which would 
create a total award four times the value of the destroyed trees.98 The 
proper interpretation of this statute is to allow for a total award of triple 
the value of destroyed trees.99 Thus, Louisiana Revised Statutes section 
3:4278.1 and similar statutes further support the double damages 
interpretation of the Mineral Code.100 
Moreover, the prevailing usage of the word “double” has not meant a 
total award of triple compensatory damages in Louisiana law. Examples 
throughout Louisiana law abound where the legislature has provided for a 
recovery worth twice the amount of a certain sum, and Louisiana courts 
have interpreted these provisions to allow for double—rather than treble—
damages.101 For example, a statute phrased similarly to the articles in the 
Mineral Code provides for an award “of double the amount of health and 
accident benefits due” when an insurer fails to pay benefits within 30 days 
of receiving written notice.102 The Louisiana Supreme Court has 
consistently held that this statute does not entitle plaintiffs to treble 
damages but rather a statutory maximum award of double the benefits 
due.103  
The legislature, which understands the prevailing usage of the terms 
“double” and “treble,” is cognizant of the words it uses when writing 
laws.104 For example, the legislature has said that an insurer owes a duty 
                                                                                                             
 97. Id. (emphasis added). 
 98. See Hornsby v. Bayou Jack Logging, 902 So. 2d 361, 371–72 (La. 2005) 
(Weimar, J., concurring). 
 99. See id.; LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 3:4278.1(B). 
 100. Hornsby, 902 So. 2d at 371–72 (Weimar, J., concurring). 
 101. See, e.g., Royal Air, Inc. v. Pronto Delivery Serv., Inc., 917 So. 2d 1197, 
1198 (La. Ct. App. 2005) (interpreting Louisiana Revised Statutes section 
9:2782.2, allowing for “damages of twice the amount so owing” when a drawer 
stops payment on a check “with the intent to defraud or when there is no justifiable 
dispute as to the amount owed”); West v. Lincoln Income Life Ins. Co., 239 So. 
2d 379, 382 (La. Ct. App. 1970) (holding that under Louisiana Revised statutes 
section 22:1821—formerly Louisiana Revised Statutes section 22:657—“the 
statutory provision for ‘a penalty . . . of double the amount of the health and 
accident benefits due’ does not entitle plaintiff to a total triple the benefits, but 
only double the benefits” (citing Frey v. Manhattan Life Ins. Co. of N.Y., 162 So. 
633 (La. 1935); Thomas v. Universal Life Ins. Co., 201 So. 2d 529 (La. Ct. App. 
1967))). 
 102. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22:1821 (Supp. 2015) (formerly section 22:657). 
 103. West, 239 So. 2d at 382 (citing Frey, 162 So. 633; Thomas, 201 So. 2d 
529). 
 104. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 38:2301(F) (1968), repealed by Act No. 
18, § 1, 1988 La. Acts 28 (providing that a contractor must pay its worker “the 




of good faith to its insured.105 If the insurer violates that duty, “the claimant 
may be awarded penalties assessed against the insurer in an amount not to 
exceed two times the damages sustained or five thousand dollars, 
whichever is greater” in addition to any general or special damages the 
claimant receives.106 The Louisiana Supreme Court has interpreted this 
statute to allow for a total award equaling triple the value of the damages 
because the statute makes clear that “the penalty is calculated based on 
‘the amount found to be due from the insurer to the insured’ in addition to 
the amount of the loss.”107 If the intent was to provide treble damages in 
the Mineral Code, the legislature could have chosen language like the 
following: “In addition to the amount of unpaid royalties, the court may 
award as damages double the amount of royalties due.”  
Based on the many other Louisiana statutes that explicitly provide for 
treble damages, the drafters of the Mineral Code clearly did not intend for 
treble damages to apply to these articles. The custom of the Louisiana 
legislature is to explicitly use the word “double” when intending to award a 
total award worth double the amount of damages and to expressly use the 
words “treble” or “triple” or include phrases like “in addition to the royalties 
due” when intending for a total award worth treble the amount of 
damages.108 One must assume that the legislature carefully and purposefully 
chose each word in accordance with well-settled principles of statutory 
construction.109 Thus, the Mineral Code articles addressing damages must 
be construed to allow a maximum award of double the amount of royalties 
due, rather than triple that amount. 
2. Historical Interpretation 
Unlike logical interpretation, historical interpretation looks beyond 
the text of the statute to determine the legislative intent or purpose.110 A 
                                                                                                             
amount by which he has been underpaid plus, as a penalty, twice that amount”); 
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22:1973(C). 
 105. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22:1973(C). 
 106. Id. 
 107. Durio v. Horace Mann Ins. Co., 74 So. 3d 1159, 1170 (La. 2011). 
 108. See supra notes 95, 101. 
 109. Sultana Corp. v. Jewelers Mut. Ins. Co., 860 So. 2d 1112, 1119 (La. 
2003); see also GÉNY, supra note 63, no. 101, at 190 (stating that “[s]ince the 
statute is a product of conscious and reflective thought of its author, not only must 
he have visualized exactly the rule he intended to establish, but it must be also 
assumed that he has chosen, with reflection and premeditation, the words which 
faithfully express his thought and will”). 
 110. P. RAYMOND LAMONICA & JERRY G. JONES, LEGISLATIVE LAW & 
PROCEDURE § 7.8, in 20 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE 213 (2d ed. 2014); see 
also BERGEL, supra note 63, at 240. 




look at the history surrounding the enactment of a statute can be crucial in 
understanding the intentions of the legislature.111 Under this category of 
interpretation, one must consider the applicable legislative history and 
sources upon which the legislature based the language of the statute.112 
Although the legislature used no sources to draft the Mineral Code 
articles,113 several pieces of legislative history are particularly useful to 
determine the drafters’ intent.114  
Using this method of interpretation, two letters provide valuable 
insight into the intent of the drafters of these Mineral Code articles.115 
George W. Hardy, III, Reporter of the Louisiana State Law Institute’s 
project to adopt the Louisiana Mineral Code, wrote the first letter to the 
Mineral Law Advisory Committee.116 This letter shows that the drafters 
were presented with Recommendation 212(c) for Mineral Code articles 
139 and 140.117 Recommendation 212(c) provided that “the lessor should 
be entitled to recover treble the amount due plus interest on the total 
amount which he is entitled.”118 A second letter, from a member of the 
Committee to Dean Hardy written shortly before the Mineral Code was 
enacted in 1974, shows that the drafters rejected the treble damages 
approach from Recommendation 212(c) in favor of Recommendation 
132(c), which stated that “the lessor is entitled to recover double the 
                                                                                                             
 111. See GÉNY, supra note 63, no. 104, at 201 (stating that legislative records 
are an important tool when used solely to discover the intent of the legislature). 
 112. LAMONICA & JONES, supra note 110, § 7.8, at 213; see also BERGEL, supra 
note 63, at 242–43 (regarding legislative history). 
 113. A thorough review of the Law Institute records and legislative history did 
not reveal any source articles. 
 114. Legislative history can shed light on the legislative intent of a statute; 
however, it is merely considered a persuasive authority. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1 cmt. 
b (2015); see also CÔTÉ, supra note 73, at 542. There are two types of sources that 
together make up the method of “legislative history.” LAMONICA & JONES, supra 
note 110, § 7.10, at 231. The first is chronological and sequential, which lays out 
the variations in the language of a specific law over time by multiple acts of the 
legislature. Id. The second examines legislative materials that reflect the events 
of passage of a particular act. Id.; see also E. Baton Rouge Parish Sch. Bd. v. 
Foster, 851 So. 2d 985, 999 (La. 2003) (stating that contemporaneous statements 
made during the enactment process should not be regarded as conclusive evidence 
of the legislative intent because the understanding of one or a few members of the 
legislature is not determinative of the legislature’s intent as a whole). 
 115. See Letter from Richard E. Gerard to Dean George W. Hardy, III (Apr. 
11, 1974) (on file with author); Letter from Dean George W. Hardy, III to Mineral 
Law Advisory Committee (Aug. 7, 1970) (on file with author). 
 116. Letter from Dean George W. Hardy, III to Mineral Law Advisory 
Committee (Aug. 7, 1970) (on file with author). 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. 




amount due plus legal interest from the date on which the royalties were 
due.”119  
Afterwards, the advisory committee’s Exposé Des Motifs, which was 
created in preparation of drafting the Mineral Code to highlight 
recommendations in the area of law to the Council of the Louisiana State Law 
Institute, included Recommendation 132(c).120 This recommendation, which 
advocates for “double” the amount due, is credited as the source for Mineral 
Code articles 139 and 140, instead of Recommendation 212(c), which 
called for “treble” the amount due.121 Some may argue that the correct 
interpretation of Recommendation 132(c) is to allow for treble damages, 
which would mean Recommendation 212(c) would have to be interpreted 
to allow for a total award of quadruple the royalties due. This interpretation 
is highly unlikely because Louisiana does not have any laws providing for 
quadruple damages.122 Even more persuasive, the United States Supreme 
Court has stated that punitive damages awards of more than four times the 
value of actual damages may be close to the line of constitutional 
impropriety.123 The drafters of the Louisiana Mineral Code probably did 
not wish to push the constitutional boundaries of due process. Notably, 
other influential mineral law states do not allow for more than mere 
interest on royalties due.124 The drafters of the Mineral Code likely debated 
between double and treble damages but chose for a double royalties 
remedy to apply, which becomes even more evident after using both the 
exegetical and teleological methods of interpretation. 
B. Teleological Method 
Unlike the exegetical method, which uses grammatical, logical, and 
historical elements to determine the legislative intent of a statute, the 
teleological method is more concerned with the social purpose that the 
                                                                                                             
 119. Id. at 3; Letter from Gerard, supra note 115, at 2. 
 120. LA. LAW INST., SUGGESTED PRINCIPLES, supra note 40, at 188. 
 121. Letter from Gerard, supra note 115, at 2. 
 122. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 9 (2015). 
 123. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 425 (2003). 
 124. See, e.g., TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 91.403 (West, Westlaw through 
2015 Regular Session of the 84th Legislature) (providing interest to a payee “at 
two percentage points above the percentage rate charged on loans to depository 
institutions by the New York Federal Reserve Bank, unless a different rate of 
interest is specified in a written agreement between payor and payee”); see also 
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, § 570.10 (West 2000) (stating that the portion of 
proceeds not paid shall earn interest at the rate of 12% per annum to be 
compounded annually, and be calculated from the end of the month in which 
production is sold until the day paid, but if the failure to pay is due to an 
unmarketable title, the interest rate is 6% per annum). 




legislature intended and applies the law in a way that does not frustrate 
that purpose.125 This method requires the interpreter to identify the 
legislative intent by consulting legislative history or sometimes by simply 
looking to the title of the statute in question.126 Article 10 of the Louisiana 
Civil Code supports this method of interpretation by stating, “[w]hen the 
language of the law is susceptible of different meanings, it must be 
interpreted as having the meaning that best conforms to the purpose of the 
law.”127  
In the case of Mineral Code articles 137 through 141, the drafters 
included the intent of the articles in the comment to article 137, noting that 
“it is the intent of Articles 137–141 to provide lessors with a meaningful 
remedy while simultaneously giving operators who have made substantial 
investments in producing properties the security of title which the nature 
and size of their investment deserves.”128 The Louisiana State Law 
Institute committee’s Recommendation 132(c) in its Exposé Des Motifs, 
created in preparation of the drafting of the Mineral Code, gave the same 
intent.129  
Both interpretations appear to fall in line with the social purpose and 
intent of the articles of providing a “meaningful remedy.” In light of the 
intent and purpose of the articles, making the potential damages remedy 
as large as possible could sensibly add a greater incentive for the lessees 
to make royalty payments in a timely manner, thus lending support to the 
treble damages interpretation.130 No evidence, however, shows just how 
large of a remedy the legislature intended to provide for lessors. 
Additionally, a double remedy is already a substantial award that can be 
quite “meaningful,” and one cannot infer that the legislature necessarily 
intended for an even greater award just because it wished to advance a 
policy that provides a “meaningful remedy.” 
Further, a remedy worth triple the amount of unpaid royalties would 
frustrate the intent of the statute because that penalty might be so great as 
to deter investment, which is certainly contrary to the goal of the articles. 
                                                                                                             
 125. STEINER, supra note 64, at 73; see also BERGEL, supra note 63, at 241 
(noting the teleological method is sometimes referred to as “Méthode du but 
social” in French, which translated into English is “The Sociological Method”). 
 126. GÉNY, supra note 63, no. 103, at 197 (“[T]o understand the practical 
scope of the statute the interpreter must reconstruct as exactly as possible the fact 
situation the legislator intended to regulate, and all the circumstances which 
determined it and which came from the ethical, political, social, economical and 
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supra note 64, at 73. 
 127. LA. CIV. CODE art. 10 (2015). 
 128. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:137 cmt. (2000). 
 129. LA. LAW INST., SUGGESTED PRINCIPLES, supra note 40, at 188. 
 130. See supra Part II.A.2. 




The drafters were not solely concerned with providing a “meaningful 
remedy” to lessors, as they were also trying to balance that interest against 
“the harsh remedy of cancellation.”131 A large treble damages award 
looming over the heads of potential lessees could deter them from 
investing in the first place, contravening this policy. A treble damages 
award might be too large for a potential lessee to risk, and excluding 
mineral leases from commerce is not what the drafters of the articles 
intended. 
C. Secondary Sources 
In addition to the teleological and exegetical methods of interpreting 
the Mineral Code articles supporting a finding of double damages, 
jurisprudence and doctrine also support this conclusion. Unlike the other 
49 states, jurisprudence and doctrine are both considered secondary 
sources of law in Louisiana and are merely persuasive authority.132  
1. Jurisprudence 
Even if judicial decisions are only considered persuasive authority in 
Louisiana, a thorough review of jurisprudence is crucial to a proper 
civilian analysis. Currently, only two of the Louisiana circuit courts of 
appeal have addressed the issue directly.133 Thus, with respect to the 
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 133. See Cimarex Energy Co. v. Mauboules, 6 So. 3d 399 (La. Ct. App. 3d 
2009) (affirming the lower court’s calculation of treble damages); Wegman v. 
Cent. Transmission, Inc., 499 So. 2d 436 (La. Ct. App. 2d 1986) (affirming the 
lower court’s decision to allow treble damages but noting that the defendant never 
argued that the damages were excessive under the Mineral Code). 




doctrine of jurisprudence constante, a court’s interpretation of the issue 
can start from a clean slate, unclouded by previous jurisprudence.134 
a. The Second Circuit Skirts Treble 
The Second Circuit in Wegman v. Central Transmission, Inc. was the 
first appellate court to decide whether the Mineral Code provides for 
double or treble damages in the event that a mineral lessee fails to pay its 
lessor owed royalties.135 The court interpreted Mineral Code article 140 to 
provide for an award equal to the original royalties due plus an additional 
damages award equal to twice the amount of royalties due, essentially 
resulting in a treble damages award.136 At the trial court level, the jury 
interpreted the article to allow for a maximum award of twice the unpaid 
royalties plus attorney’s fees and subsequently awarded the plaintiff that 
amount.137 After the jury rendered its award, the defendant filed a motion 
for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, and the trial court modified the 
judgment to award the plaintiff triple the value of the unpaid royalties.138 
On appeal to the Second Circuit, the defendant asserted that the trial 
judge erred by awarding a total award of treble the unpaid royalties, 
instead of double.139 The court noted that this defendant never claimed that 
the award was more than authorized by article 140.140 After deciding that 
the trial court’s modification of the award was not a substantive change in 
the law but rather a correction of an error by the jury, the court essentially 
deferred to the trial court’s decision to allow treble damages.141 What 
might have happened if the defendant had challenged the damages award 
as being excessive under article 140 is uncertain, but lessors often cite this 
case in support of their argument that they are entitled to treble damages.142 
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 135. 499 So. 2d 436 (1987). 
 136. Id. at 452. 
 137. Id. at 452–53. 
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Ultimately, Wegman does not provide meaningful guidance because the 
Second Circuit only answered whether the trial court was allowed to 
modify the jury award, not whether the Mineral Code authorizes treble 
damages.143 
b. The Third Circuit Runs into Treble 
The Third Circuit was directly presented with this damages issue in 
Cimarex Energy Co. v. Mauboules.144 This time, the court addressed the 
damages clause in Mineral Code article 212.23.145 The trial court awarded 
the plaintiffs unpaid royalties of approximately $3.2 million, plus an 
additional statutory damages award of roughly $6.4 million, resulting in a 
treble remedy totaling nearly $9.6 million.146 Unlike the lessees in 
Wegman, the defendants challenged the damages award as being in excess 
of the amount contemplated by article 212.23.147 Without providing much 
discussion on the damages issue, the Third Circuit looked to Wegman and 
affirmed the lower court’s method of calculation that resulted in a treble 
damages award.148 The court reasoned that the royalties owed to the 
plaintiffs were not damages but rather a sum of money owed to them 
because they were the rightful owners of those royalty interests.149 The 
court claimed that the Mineral Code clearly states that a court may award 
double the amount due “as damages.”150 Thus, the court concluded that, in 
addition to owing the unpaid royalties, the obligor must also pay the 
additional double royalties as damages to the obligee, creating a total 
award of triple the amount of the original unpaid royalties.151 
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 145. Id. at 407; LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:212.23(C) (2000). 
 146. Cimarex, 40 So. 3d at 952 (Knoll, J., dissenting). 
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c. Justice Knoll Tries to Bail the Appellate Courts Out of Treble 
The Cimarex case went to the Louisiana Supreme Court in 2010, but 
the majority decided the case on a different basis.152 Thus, the damages 
issue was moot, and the majority never addressed it.153 Justice Knoll, 
however, addressed the issue in her dissenting opinion.154 She found that 
the trial court erred as a matter of law by awarding the plaintiffs excessive 
damages pursuant to Mineral Code article 212.23.155 Justice Knoll noted 
that the trial court was incorrect in effectively tripling—rather than 
doubling—the damages award by its method of calculation.156 She pointed 
out that a far more natural reading of the Mineral Code article would allow 
the plaintiff a total award of double the amount of unpaid royalties.157 She 
came to this conclusion by reasoning that if the legislature intended to 
permit treble damages, it would have unambiguously permitted an award 
of treble damages as it did in many other articles throughout the Civil 
Code.158 She then pointed to several Louisiana laws that included language 
such as “treble damages” or “damages triple the amount of royalties 
due.”159 Justice Knoll found additional support in the fact that these 
damages provisions are penal in nature, such that they must be strictly 
construed in favor of the lessee.160 
d. Courts That Stayed Out of Treble 
Several other courts have been presented with damages issues 
stemming from Mineral Code articles 139 and 140, but none of those cases 
addressed the issue of double versus treble damages directly at the 
appellate level.161 In several cases, however, the trial courts awarded the 
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plaintiffs damages worth double the unpaid royalties, rather than treble.162 
In Broussard v. Union Pacific Resources Co., the Third Circuit affirmed 
the trial court’s damages award equaling double the amount of unpaid 
royalties, arguably interpreting the language of the statute to only allow 
for double, rather than treble, the unpaid royalties.163 Unfortunately, the 
opinion did not discuss the damages issue in detail and simply affirmed 
the lower court’s award.164 Although none of these cases addressed this 
issue directly, they do demonstrate that several trial courts allowed for a 
maximum of double the royalties due. 
2. Doctrine 
Doctrinal sources of law are another tool that civilian interpreters can 
use in their quest to ascertain the legislative intent of a statute.165 Like 
jurisprudence, doctrine is not considered a true source of law in a civilian 
system of law such as Louisiana but can be highly persuasive.166 
Considering doctrine looks to writings of those experts in the area of law 
at issue.167 Publications from journals of law schools and legal treatises are 
additional doctrinal sources, along with the work of the Louisiana State 
Law Institute, which has encouraged a “revival of civilian thinking and 
theory” since its inception in 1938.168  
Doctrine has been important in dealing with mineral law issues, as 
scholars and commentators have weighed in on whether Mineral Code 
articles 138.1, 139, 140, and 212.23 provide for double or treble damages. 
For example, after Wegman was decided, former Commissioner of 
                                                                                                             
 162. Broussard, 778 So. 2d at 1201–02; Matthews, 521 So. 2d at 1195; Bailey, 
479 So. 2d at 565. 
 163. Broussard, 778 So. 2d at 1205. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Tate, supra note 17, at 739; see also JEAN CARBONNIER, DROIT CIVIL: 
INTRODUCTION 269 (26th ed. 1999). 
 166. CARBONNIER, supra note 165, at 269; Grissel, supra note 63, at 540. 
 167. Tate, supra note 17, at 728; see also Paul M. Hebert, Editorial, The Law 
Review and the Law School, 1 LA. L. REV. 157, 158 (1938). Former Dean of the 
Louisiana State University Law School Paul M. Hebert expressed the importance 
of doctrinal materials to the legal profession when he gave a speech 
commemorating the founding of the Louisiana Law Review in 1938. Id. 
 168. Tate, supra note 17, at 740. One respected Louisiana jurist, Albert Tate, 
Jr., believes that doctrine is more influential in Louisiana law than many give it 
credit, noting that one law review commentary can substantially influence a 
judge’s interpretation and application of certain laws. Id. Judge Tate added that 
the work of law reviews, including student notes and comments supervised by 
faculty and leading members of the bar, are invaluable aids in helping evaluate 
the background and context of statutes, while also discerning the legislative or 
social intent of a law in dispute. Id. 




Conservation Professor Patrick H. Martin noted that the trial court was 
correct in entering a judgment allowing for treble damages.169 Professor 
Martin agreed with the decision to allow for treble damages in a 1987 law 
review article but did not provide any analysis or give any reasons as to 
why he agreed with the interpretation.170 Further, in a recent interview with 
this Author, Professor Martin explained that he still agrees with the 
interpretation calling for treble damages.171 He also cited a chapter from 
the Louisiana Mineral Law Treatise to support his stance that the Mineral 
Code articles provide for treble damages.172  
This Mineral Law Treatise, a doctrinal source of law in its own right, 
provides several rationales as to why the treble damages interpretation 
might be correct.173 First, the court may “award ‘double the amount of 
royalties due,’” even when the lessee has already paid all of the royalties 
under Mineral Code article 138 in response to the written notice.174 One 
argument made in this treatise claims that any contrary interpretation of 
the damages clause in Mineral Code article 139 would make the phrase 
superfluous, as that article only applies when a lessee has paid all of the 
royalties due.175 Proponents of this argument suggest that the damages 
provision allowing courts to “award as damages double the amount of 
royalties due” would be rendered meaningless because no royalties would 
be due.176 To further this argument in the context of Mineral Code article 
140—where the lessee has not paid any royalties due—the treatise argues 
that it would lead to an absurd result if the penalties made available to an 
unpaid lessor were limited to double damages, while a paid lessor may 
recover treble damages under article 139.177 This argument is incorrect, 
however, because Mineral Code article 140 also uses the same language 
and also provides for a maximum penalty of double damages.178 Further, 
the treatise cites appellate court cases, such as Cimarex and Wegman, that 
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decided the Mineral Code articles allow for treble damages to bolster its 
argument.179 These courts misinterpreted the provisions, however, by 
failing to perform a thorough exegetical and teleological analysis. Further, 
given Louisiana’s civil law tradition, these cases should not be given any 
weight because they are not backed by persuasive authority.180 
Professor Martin also provides an insightful policy argument to further 
support his opinion. He points to the comments of the articles to show how 
the courts created the articles to counteract the strong-arm tactics of 
producers.181 He contends that because the goal of the articles is to 
diminish lease dissolutions, while still having teeth in the remedy, 
allowing for a larger potential award is more sensible because under many 
of these articles, the award is up the court’s discretion, rather than the 
jury.182 Professor Martin further believes that treble damages would fall 
more in line with the intent of incentivizing the payments of royalties.183 
Professor Martin may be correct that a larger potential penalty would 
create more of an incentive for a lessee to pay royalties due, but both a 
double and treble damages award would seem to deter a lessee from failing 
to make royalty payments, especially when those payments are often very 
significant. How large of an incentive the legislature intended to provide 
to spur the payment of royalties is simply unclear, seeing that double the 
amount of unpaid royalties could often be considered a substantial amount. 
Aside from Professor Martin’s views, scholarship in recent years has 
advocated for the double damages interpretation. Jonathan Hunter, one 
commentator in favor of an interpretation that embraces double damages, 
criticizes the Second Circuit’s decision in Wegman for awarding treble 
damages without any discussion or analysis.184 Additionally, he notes that 
the lessee never challenged the award as excessive under the Mineral 
Code.185 This diminishes the usefulness of the Wegman decision because 
it is not binding authority.186 Another advocate of this interpretation of 
double damages is Sarah Y. Dicharry, who wrote a student casenote for 
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the Loyola Law Review in 2011 highlighting the Louisiana Supreme Court 
case of Cimarex v. Mauboules.187 
In her casenote, Dicharry argues that the courts should interpret the 
language of the Mineral Code by its plain meaning.188 She reasons that, if 
the drafters of the Code intended for the damages to equal treble the 
amount of unpaid royalties, they would have explicitly stated that intent, 
but instead, the statutes permit the court in its discretion to award “double” 
damages.189 Dicharry focuses on Justice Knoll’s dissenting opinion in 
Cimarex v. Mauboles and opines that Justice Knoll was correct in deciding 
that the appropriate calculation of damages for the applicable Mineral 
Code articles was double, and not treble, the amount of royalties due.190 
She states that the correct damages amount should have been “the royalties 
due plus the royalties due, not the royalties due plus two times the royalties 
due” because to interpret the Mineral Code otherwise would lead to an 
excessive damages award.191 
The scholars and commentators are split on whether these articles 
allow for a maximum of double or treble damages, just like many of the 
lower courts in the state.192 But in Louisiana, both jurisprudence and 
doctrine are merely persuasive sources of law.193 The true meaning of the 
Mineral Code articles must be ascertained from the legislation itself.194 
The most natural reading of the articles does not provide for treble 
damages, as proven by previously written pieces of legislation. A study of 
the language contained in other pieces of legislation makes clear that the 
lawmakers intended for these articles to allow for a maximum award of 
double damages.195 Additionally, the fact that the articles are penal in 
nature means that they must be strictly construed in favor of allowing for 
a maximum of double damages.196 Therefore, the doctrinal sources are 
highly persuasive in their reasoning that the Mineral Code articles provide 
for double, rather than treble, damages. 
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III. A PROPOSAL FOR THE MINERAL CODE TO CLEARLY 
STAY OUT OF TREBLE 
A sound interpretation of any ambiguous statute must include much 
more than just a literal reading of the text. To only consider one or two 
interpretive tools that a civilian has at his or her disposal, rather than to 
pursue every available avenue of interpretation to ascertain the legislative 
intent of a statute, would be a true disservice to the civilian system of law. 
The interpretive methods employed in this Comment produce compelling 
arguments for the Mineral Code interpretation allowing for only double 
damages and debunk the notion that they may provide for treble 
damages.197 After weighing all of the arguments, the legislature clearly 
intended for a total award of double the unpaid royalties to apply, rather 
than treble that amount.  
Due to disagreement among Louisiana courts, scholars, and 
practitioners, the need for clarity in the law dictates that the Louisiana 
legislature should revise the damages provisions in Mineral Code articles 
138.1 through 140 and 212.23 to expressly state that the total award may 
only be worth a maximum of twice the amount of royalties due. Though 
this conclusion is clear after a thorough civilian analysis of the drafters’ 
intent, the legislature should always strive to have statutes that are facially 
clear, not requiring interpretation past the plain language of the text. To 
that end, the Louisiana Legislature should revise the applicable articles 
with the following language: “The court may award a total award in an 
amount not to exceed twice the amount of royalties due, not including the 
interest on that sum from the date due, and reasonable attorney’s fees.” 
This revision would end the confusion in this area of law and clarify that 
these Mineral Code articles do not provide for treble damages, as some 
have wrongly interpreted them to provide.198  
If the legislature chooses not to revise the provision, it should at least 
add a comment to the applicable articles to explain that the total award 
may amount to a maximum of double the amount of the unpaid royalties. 
In this comment, the legislature could provide a concrete example to 
further add clarity. The comment could simply provide:  
[T]hese articles allow for a total award equal to a maximum of 
double the amount of unpaid royalties. For example, if a lessee 
fails to pay royalties due in the amount $1 million, the court may 
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award an additional $1 million in damages, for a total award of $2 
million, inclusive of the principal amount of unpaid royalties. 
An award equal to double the amount of unpaid royalties is what the 
drafters of the Mineral Code intended when they created articles 138.1 
through 140 and 212.23. Thus it must be applied as such by the courts. A 
rewording of the language in the statutes or an addition to the comments 
in the Mineral Code would help solve the dispute by adding clarity to the 
law. 
CONCLUSION 
The proposed versions of Mineral Code articles 138.1, 139, 140, and 
212.23 will clarify that the Mineral Code should not be construed to 
provide for treble damages. Even a simple comment to the articles would 
make this area of law clearer. The legislative intent is for these articles to 
provide for double, rather than treble, damages. The Mineral Code needs 
to clarify these provisions so that courts do not continue to interpret the 
articles incorrectly and award lessors with excessive damages that the 
drafters never intended. As a result, calculating damage awards under 
these articles will be much easier, and courts will not be inclined to follow 
prior cases that misinterpreted the statutes and awarded treble damages. A 
double damages interpretation provides lessors with a meaningful remedy 
in the event of nonpayment but does not deter lessees from entering into a 
lease initially. This interpretation is directly in line with the intent of the 
drafters and advances sound public policy.  
 
Nathan Telep* 
                                                                                                             
  J.D./D.C.L., 2015, Paul M. Hebert Law Center, Louisiana State University. 
Attorney at Bradley Murchison Kelly & Shea LLC in Shreveport, Louisiana. The 
Author wishes to thank Professors John Randall Trahan and Patrick S. Ottinger 
for their guidance and support throughout the writing process. Additionally, the 
Author thanks his parents, Kevin and Christi Telep, for their unwavering love, 
support, and encouragement throughout his life. 
